What factors underlie industry differences in research intensity and productivity growth? We develop a multi-sector endogenous growth model allowing for industry specific parameters in the production functions for output and knowledge, and in consumer preferences. We find that long run industry differences in both productivity growth and R&D intensity mainly reflect differences in "technological opportunities", interpreted as the parameters of knowledge production. These include the capital intensity of R&D, knowledge spillovers, and diminishing returns to R&D. To investigate the quantitative importance of these factors, we calibrate the model using US industry data. We find that the observed variation in the capital intensity of research cannot account for industry differences in productivity growth rates, and that variation in intertemporal knowledge spillovers has counterfactual predictions for R&D intensity when it is an important factor behind differences in productivity growth rates. This suggests that diminishing returns to research activity is the dominant factor. JEL Codes: D24, O3, O41
Introduction
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates differ widely across industries, and these differences appear linked to persistent cross-industry differences in R&D intensity. This link is sometimes interpreted as causation. However, a priori it is not clear why the level of industry R&D should affect industry productivity growth, a point that has been made by Jones (1995) for the aggregate economy. Rather, both R&D and productivity growth depend on the response of firms to deeper industry parameters.
We develop a general equilibrium model in which both research activity and productivity growth vary endogenously across industries, to identify the factors that account for differences in each. We show that the factors that influence TFP growth also have an impact on R&D intensity. However, we also show that the converse is not true: there exists a set of industry characteristics that affect the level of industry R&D, but not necessarily industry productivity growth rates.
We build the model according to criteria that we believe define a natural benchmark. First, industries differ in terms of factors commonly identified in the empirical literature as being potential determinants of research intensity: technological opportunity (factors that affect the efficiency of research), appropriability (the extent to which R&D benefits the innovator) and demand (which influences the returns to research). Second, these factors are implemented in the model using standard preference and technology parameters drawn from growth theory. The industry-specific factors we study are: diminishing returns to research, knowledge spillovers over time, knowledge spillovers across firms, capital intensity in the production of goods, capital intensity in the production of ideas, the elasticity of substitution across different varieties of goods within each industry, and the industry's market size.
Comparing across industries, we find that differences in TFP growth rates depend only on factors of technological opportunity. These include the extent to which research is subject to diminishing returns, the capital share of research spending, and total knowledge spillovers. By contrast, differences in R&D intensity also depend on appropriability, defined as the extent to which knowledge spillovers accrue from the firm's own stock of knowledge. Product demand is fundamental in providing incentives to perform research: nevertheless, we find that in an equilibrium where the distribution of firm productivity is stable within industries, industry differences in equilibrium TFP growth rates and R&D intensity do not depend on the parameters that underlie product demand. 1 To narrow down which factors of technological opportunity might best account for crossindustry comparisons in a production-function based framework, we calibrate as many model parameters as possible using US industry data, and use simulations to investigate the impact of the remaining parameters. The industry parameters we calibrate are the capital intensity in the production of goods, capital intensity in the production of ideas, the elasticity of substitution across different varieties of goods within each industry, and the industry's market size. We use simulations to assess the impact of diminishing returns to research, knowledge spillovers over time, and knowledge spillovers across firms.
R&D intensity even when we choose appropriability values so as to maximize their influence. As a result, the model indicates that variation in diminishing returns to research and in the magnitude of spillovers must jointly account for patterns of productivity growth and research activity.
Finally, we use simulations to compare different possible combinations of the two highlighted factors. We find that intertemporal knowledge spillovers have counterfactual predictions for R&D intensity when they are assumed to be an important factor behind variation in productivity growth rates, as they imply a non-monotonic relationship between these variables. By contrast, the model is able to account jointly for the observed variation in productivity growth rates and in R&D intensity when differences in diminishing returns are emphasized instead. This suggests that variation in diminishing returns to research activity is the dominating factor among those we consider. 3 We find that the correlation between industry R&D in the model and in the data can be as high as 72%, indicating that the mechanisms in the model are able to account simultaneously for industry variation in both productivity growth and research intensity.
In related work, Klenow (1996) studies the determinants of cross-industry differences in TFP growth and R&D intensity in a 2-sector version of the Romer (1990) model. Krusell (1998) develops a 2-sector framework to endogenize the decline in the price of capital relative to consumption goods documented by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) , and Vourvachaki (2006) also features a two-sector endogenous growth model: however, in these papers, there is only research in one sector, and the focus is not on the factors that determine industry TFP growth rates. In the partial equilibrium model of Nelson (1988) , the extent to which knowledge spills from a firm to its competitors affects R&D intensity but not TFP growth rates, and our general equilibrium environment also yields this result. Klevorick et al (1995) and Nelson and Wolff (1997) provide evidence supporting this claim.
Section 2 provides an overview of the related literature. We do this to line up the factors we wish to embody later in our model. Section 3 describes the structure of the model and outlines the main results, and Section 4 studies its long run behavior. Section 5 uses a calibration of the model to determine the relative importance of different potential determinants of research and productivity differences. Section 6 discusses possible extensions.
Related Literature
Industry TFP growth rates appear linked to cross-industry variation in R&D intensitysee Terleckyj (1980) for an early survey. Many studies have attempted to identify the determinants of industry variation in R&D. While some studies assume that research causes productivity growth, others take our view that both are determined by deeper "fundamentals" of each industry. Consistent with our approach, Nelson and Wolff (1998) are able to identify factors that explain R&D intensity that do not account for TFP growth rates.
The literature has focused on three sets of factors that might drive industry research activity and TFP growth: product demand, technological opportunity, and appropriability.
Technological opportunity encompasses factors that lead research to be more productive in some industries than others. Opportunity has been modeled in different ways -for example, in Klenow (1996) it is a constant Z i in the knowledge production function for industry i. Nelson (1988) interprets opportunity in terms of knowledge spillovers from different sources. Measuring opportunity is difficult: however, using surveys of R&D managers, Levin et al (1985) , Cohen et al (1987) and Klevorick et al (1995) try to identify different kinds of spillovers, relating them to R&D activity and to technical change.
Appropriability relates to the extent that an innovating firm (as opposed to its competitors) benefits from its own newly generated knowledge. Cohen et al (1987) , Klevorick et al (1995) and Nelson and Wolff (1997) find evidence that appropriability is related to R&D intensity and, interestingly, Klevorick et al (1995) and Nelson and Wolff (1997) argue that the survey data are consistent with an influence of opportunity factors on both R&D intensity and technical change, whereas appropriability is only related to R&D intensity.
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Demand factors affect the returns to R&D. In Schmookler (1966) , larger product markets encourage innovation by offering higher returns to innovators, whereas in Kamien and Schwartz (1970) the gains from reducing production costs may be larger when demand is more elastic. The survey of Cohen and Levin (1989) suggests that the evidence concerning demand factors is weak. For example, Levin et al (1985) find that they lose significance in cross-industry R&D regressions when indicators of opportunity and appropriability are included. Independently, several case-based and historical studies suggest that technical change is driven by scientific or engineering considerations rather than by demand conditions.
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The following stylized facts emerge from the empirical literature: (1) There is evidence that opportunity affects both statistics of interest; (2) appropriability is easier to relate to R&D intensity than to TFP growth rates; (3) the link between demand factors and research intensity (as well as rates of TFP growth) is not robust.
We wish to articulate opportunity, appropriability and demand factors within a general equilibrium growth model, based on primitives of preferences and technology drawn from the growth literature. Given the measurement difficulties inherent in studying the role of knowledge in technical progress, we use the structure of the model to guide us regarding the relationships that hold between R&D, TFP growth, and each of these factors. As a benchmark, we use a model of knowledge generation that is intentionally close to the production function approach common in both the theoretical and the empirical literature. Our model 4 Cohen et al (1987) do find a positive link between appropriability and an indicator of innovation, also using survey data. What clouds these results is that the appropriability measure in all these papers may not distinguish sharply between appropriability and opportunity. The measure is based on the response to the question "in this line of business, how much time would a capable firm typically require to effectively duplicate and introduce a new or improved product developed by a competitor?" This may not distinguish between (a) the ease with which a competitor might access a firm's knowledge, and (b) the ease in general with which preexisting knowledge can be used to generate new knowledge. In particular, if appropriability itself is generally low, then the measure may reflect mostly differences in opportunity.
5 Nelson and Winter (1977) coin the term "natural trajectories" to describe the phenomenon that "innovation has a certain inner logic of its own [...] -particularly in industries where technological advance is very rapid, advances seem to follow advances in a way that appears somewhat 'inevitable' and certainly not fine tuned to the changing demand and cost conditions." There is some evidence of an impact of market size on innovative activity at the firm or product level: however, these findings do not relate to industry differences. More discussion will follow in Section 4. maps naturally into the frameworks of Jones (1995) and Krusell (1998) . The functional forms we use are necessary for balanced growth.
Economic Environment

Knowledge Production
The economy consists of z ≥ 2 industries. Consider a firm h ∈ [0, 1] in industry i, with a level of productivity that depends upon the stock T iht of technical knowledge at its disposal at date t. Knowledge accumulates over time according to the function
where F iht .
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New knowledge F iht is generated using a knowledge production function, using the firm's research input and spillovers from other firms.
7 The knowledge production function is:
where η i , ψ i ∈ (0, 1], and Q iht and L iht are capital and labor used in the production of knowledge. The productivity index for industry i as a whole is T it ≡ R 1 0 T iht dh, which firm h takes as given. Let γ iht ≡ T iht+1 /T iht be the growth factor of T ih .
Parameters Z i , κ i , σ i , ψ i and η i represent technological opportunity, as they affect the productivity of research input. Parameter Z i is an efficiency parameter for carrying out research in industry i.
8 It could be linked to the nature of research in the industry, or to the institutional environment. Parameter κ i represents the effect of in-house knowledge on the production of new ideas, and is known in the growth literature as the intertemporal knowledge spillover. Parameter σ i represents spillovers across firms within sector i. The total knowledge spillover ρ i ≡ κ i + σ i is the extent to which the production of new knowledge in sector i benefits from prior knowledge. Parameter ψ i indicates decreasing returns to research inputs. One interpretation for ψ i < 1 is that there is duplication in research, whereby some of the knowledge created by a firm in sector i might not be new. Parameter η i captures the share of capital in R&D spending.
Conditional on total knowledge spillovers, industries may differ in the importance of in-house knowledge relative to knowledge spillovers from its competitors. We define appropriability A i as the share of total spillovers accounted for by in-house knowledge:
6 It is common to assume that ideas depreciate. There is a distinction between physical depreciation and economic depreciation, however. For ideas to physically depreciate would imply that some share of them is exogenously forgotten. Economic depreciation, on the other hand, implies that old knowledge becomes less valuable (obsolete) as newer knowledge accumulates, and rates of economic depreciation will be endogenous in our model. See Laitner and Stolyarov (2008) for a different approach based on new knowledge sometimes reducing the value of existing knowledge to zero. 7 We focus for now on within-industry spillovers, and later discuss the impact of cross-industry spillovers. 8 Nelson (1988) allows Z i grows at an exogenous rate. Since the trademark of R&D-based growth models is that technical progress is endogenous, our model does not feature exogenously growing factors other than the population.
The last set of factors considered by the empirical literature relates to demand, which we present later when we close the model using standard household preferences.
Firm's problem
Each sector i ≤ z is monopolistically competitive. Firm h in sector i produces a differentiated variety h ∈ [0, 1] of good i. Output of variety h of good i is
where Y iht is output, K iht is capital and N iht is labor. Firms are competitive in the input markets. Taking input prices (w t , R t ) and its demand function p iht (.) as given, firm h in sector i chooses both production inputs (K iht , N iht ) and R&D inputs (Q iht , L iht ) to maximize the discounted stream of real profits:
where p ct is the aggregate price-index for consumption goods, λ t is the discount factor at time t, with λ 0 = 1, λ t = t Q s=1 1 1+r t for t ≥ 1, and r t is the real interest rate. The transversality condition is lim t→∞ χ iht T iht+1 = 0, where χ iht is the shadow price of T iht+1 . 9 The complete derivation of the firm's maximization problem is given in Appendix B.1.
Equilibrium Productivity Growth
Given free mobility of inputs and competitive input markets, marginal rates of substitution are equal across activities within the firm (5), across firms within each industry (6), and also across sectors (7):
9 Note that the transversality condition implies that the shadow price χ iht is falling in any equilibrium where T iht is growing. In the rest of the paper we will continue to refer the expression χ iht+1 /χ iht as the growth factor of the shadow price. 10 The linearity of quations (5) − (7) stems from our use of Cobb-Douglas production functions. If we were to allowed for a general production function with constant elasticity of substitution, then marginal rates of substitution would be log-linear in capital-labor ratios with a coefficient equal to the elasticity of substitution. A linear relationship would still hold if the elasticity of substitution were identical across activities, firms and sectors. We choose to focus on the Cobb-Douglas productions both for the lack of measure for the sector-specific elasticity of substitution and for the possibility of deriving the balanced growth path later.
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It follows that:
Using (1) and (6), the productivity growth of firm h in sector i depends on
As our interest is in industry comparisons, we focus on equilibria where the distribution of productivity within sectors is stable and rank-preserving i.e. in each industry γ iht = γ it ∀h.
11 Then, (9) implies L iht = L it . To make meaningful comparisons across sectors, we also focus on equilibria with constant productivity growth, using (8) and (9):
Lemma 1 In any rank-preserving equilibria, constant γ i satisfies
where
is the fraction of labor allocated to research in sector i.
Three terms affect cross-industry comparisons of productivity growth: (i) the expression
, (ii) capital intensity of research activities η i , and (iii) growth in the fraction of labor allocated to research
The expression
is related to the historical work of Rosenberg (1969) and Nelson and Winter (1977) that underlines technological opportunity as a factor of productivity growth. Specifically, our model emphasizes the degree of decreasing returns to research input, the extent of intertemporal knowledge spillovers κ i , and the magnitude of spillovers across firms σ i . Interestingly, as far as spillovers are concerned, only total spillovers ρ i = κ i + σ i are important, whereas the source of spillovers is not.
We are not aware of a precedent to the second factor -the capital intensity of research activity. Technical improvements in the production of capital goods lead to capital deepening, and the extent to which this encourages research depends on η i . Rosenberg (1969) and Nelson and Winter (1977) suggest that capital-intensive industries may enjoy inherently high TFP growth. However, equation (10) shows that what matters is not capital intensity per se, but the capital-intensity of research activity. The capital-intensity of production activity may affect the measurement of productivity, but not equilibrium rates of productivity growth.
Industry-specific demand factors and appropriability A i ≡ κ i /ρ i can only matter for crossindustry productivity growth comparisons if they alter the growth rate of labor allocated to research across sectors through
Equilibrium research activity
Let χ iht be the shadow price of knowledge T iht+1 , which is determined by the arbitrage condition for allocating inputs across activities. In the case of capital:
The firm's dynamic optimization condition implies that
Equation (12) reflects three benefits to the firm of producing more knowledge: (a) more efficient production of goods and services, (b) more efficient production of knowledge, and (c) a larger stock of future knowledge. To determine the extent to which resources are directed towards research (as opposed to production), we define research intensity as the share of research spending in total costs:
.
Using (12) we have:
where by the definition of χ iht in (11):
It follows from (10) that in any rank-preserving equilibria with constant γ i ,
Growth in the price of i relative to consumption
requires knowledge of the demand function faced by each firm. Assume that price elasticities
are sector-specific constants (i.e. identical across firm within any sector i). Equating the value of marginal products of labor across firms, together with (6):
which implies that in any rank-preserving equilibria with constant γ i :
where the last equality follows from using (7) and equating the value of marginal products of labor across sectors. Substituting into (15), we have:
Lemma 2 If price elasticity μ i is a sector-specific constant then, in any rank-preserving equilibria with constant productivity growth, research intensity for any sector i satisfies:
In addition to the factors that determine γ i , there are three additional terms affecting cross-industry comparisons of research intensity: (i) the degree of diminishing returns to research input ψ i , (ii) the effect of in-house knowledge on the production of new ideas κ i , and (iii) growth in the fraction of labor allocated to research
Recall that κ i = A i ρ i , implying that research intensity is affected by both opportunity and appropriability. Moreover, if price elasticities are sector-specific constants, industryspecific demand factors can only matter for cross-industry R&D intensity comparisons if they alter the growth rate of labor allocated to research across sectors.
Relating the model to the literature
We now compare our results so far with the empirical findings reviewed in Section 2.
Consistent with evidence, comparisons of industry TFP growth rates depend on factors of technological opportunity, whereas R&D intensity also depends upon appropriability. Low appropriability lowers R&D intensity without affecting productivity growth rates, so a prediction is that there should be a negative relationship between measures of intra-industry spillovers and R&D intensity, controlling for other variables. This is exactly what Nelson and Wolff (1997) find. Klevorick et al (1995) identify two effects of appropriability on R&D intensity. First, in their terminology, there is an "incentive effect" whereby large, un-internalized spillovers reduce R&D activity, causing the negative relationship between appropriability A i and R&D intensity in Lemma 2. Second, there is also an "efficiency" effect, whereby larger spillovers may encourage R&D at other firms. The efficiency effect is seen in that, conditional on κ i , a larger value of σ i raises ρ i while leaving A i ρ i constant, so that R&D intensity rises. However, in our model, the "efficiency" effect is related to the magnitude of spillovers, not to appropriability per se and, as suggested by Klevorick et al (1995) , this effect disappears once opportunity is kept constant.
Demand parameters can only affect comparisons of TFP growth rates and research intensities through the growth in the fraction of labor allocated to research l it+1 /l it , which is unlikely to be affected stationary demand parameters such as industry size and the price elasticity of demand. This is broadly consistent with the evidence in Section 2. We return to this point after presenting the demand side of the model.
Closing the model: Households
We now close the model by specifying the demand side of the economy.
There is a continuum of households, each of measure N t = g t N , where g N captures the constant population growth. In what follows, we use lower case letters to denote per-capita variables. Goods i ∈ {1, ..m − 1} are consumption goods while goods j ∈ {m, ...z} are investment goods.
The life-time utility of a household is
where β is the discount factor, and 1/θ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We assume that βg
Parameters μ i and ω i capture the industry-specific demand factors considered in the literature. μ i is the elasticity of substitution across different varieties of good i which, in equilibrium, determines the price elasticity of demand, while ω i determines the spending share of each good (market size).
Each household member is endowed with one unit of labor and k t units of capital, and receives income by renting capital and labor to firms, and by earning profits from the firms. Her budget constraint is
where x jht is investment in variety h of capital good j, p iht is the price of variety h of good i, w t and R t are rental prices of labor and capital, and
Π iht dh equals total profits from firms. Her capital accumulation equation is
The composite investment good x t is produced using all capital types j:
where μ j > 1, ω j > 0 and P z j=m ω j = 1. 12 Finally, the transversality condition for capital is lim t→∞ ζ t k t = 0, where ζ t is the shadow price of capital. Define the price index for the consumption composite c t and the investment composite x t respectively as:
Decentralized Equilibrium
The decentralized equilibrium is standard, where the firms' and consumers' problems are defined as in Section 3. In any period t, prices must clear all goods and input markets:
Our aim is to compare productivity dynamics across industries, and not across different varieties of any given good. Therefore, we focus on equilibria that treat varieties within each sector i symmetrically, and suppress the firm index h henceforth.
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Full derivation of the household's utility maximization is given in the Appendix. The implied Euler condition is:
which implies the real discount factor:
is the gross return on capital.
Balanced growth
We look for a balanced growth path equilibrium (BGP), along which aggregate variables are growing at constant rates although industry TFP growth rates may be different. Such a BGP requires a constant ratio of consumption to capital: c/ (qk) , where q is the relative price of capital. Define Φ and γ xt as:
Proposition 1 Suppose there exists an equilibrium with constant l i , n i > 0 that satisfies the transversality conditions for T i and k. If Φ > 0, then there exists a unique balanced growth path. Along this path c/q and k grow by a constant factor (γ x ) 1/(1−αx) where γ x = g Φ N , and γ i is constant and satisfies (10).
The proof observes that the return to investment G is constant if k grows by a factor γ
, which by (30) is constant if γ i is constant in all capital good sectors. The restriction for constant γ i follows from Section 3.3, and γ x is derived from (30).
14 Proposition 1 contrasts with the behavior of the one-sector model of Jones (1995) . In Jones (1995) , Φ is replaced by
, so balanced growth path requires ρ 1 < 1 (where 1 indexes the only industry in the economy). There are two important differences compared to our requirement that Φ > 0. First, suppose η j = 0, i.e. capital is not used in the production of knowledge. Then Φ > 0 is equivalent to P z j=m ω j ψ j 1−ρ j > 0, so the Jones (1995) restriction applies to the weighted average of
across capital goods in the multi-sector model.
15
Second, the restriction P z j=m ω j ψ j 1−ρ j > 0 is not sufficient when capital is used in the production of knowledge (η j > 0 for some j ≥ m), as productivity improvements targeting capital goods become a factor of aggregate productivity growth by inducing capital deepening in R&D.
Comparing industries
In equilibrium, industries with the same level of technological opportunity (i.e. the same values of ψ i , ρ i = κ i + σ i and η i but different appropriability A i = κ i /ρ i ) display different R&D intensity, even if they have the same TFP growth rate. It follows from Lemmae (1) and (2) that:
Proposition 2 Along the balanced growth path, (i) Cross-industry comparisons of productivity growth depend only on the technological opportunity factors ρ i , ψ i and η i .
(ii) In addition to these factors, cross-industry comparisons of R&D intensity depend also on appropriability A i .
Notice that differences in demand parameters affect neither comparisons of productivity growth rates nor of R&D intensity when l i are constants. 16 General equilibrium mechanisms play a key role in this result.
In the model there are two industry demand parameters: ω i , the weight of good i in the demand function, and μ i , the elasticity of substitution across varieties of i. The spending share of each good depends on ω i , and the elasticity of a firm's demand function depends on μ i . Since ω i affects the level of returns to production at all dates, but not their growth rate, it does not affect the decision of whether to use resources for investment in future production (via increases in knowledge) instead of current production.
The reason μ i may matter in partial equilibrium is that elastic demand allows an innovator to increase market share without having to lower her output price to the same extent as the cost reduction. However, in equilibrium, all firms are performing research: R&D by the firm's competitors results in a commensurate fall in the relative price of their goods, so that this partial equilibrium benefit of research need not materialize in general equilibrium.
It is worth elaborating upon this last point. The literature on appropriability distinguishes between two channels whereby research by a firm might affect its competitors. The first is the "spillover effect" (captured by σ i in our model) whereby innovations by one firm may be used by another. The second is the "business stealing" or "product rivalry" effect whereby innovations by a firm's competitors decreases its market share. In our model, the severity of this rivalry depends on μ i . To see this, note that c ih is proportional to p −μ i ih , so that the relative market share of two firms h and h 0 in the same industry is:
where p ih c ih are the sales of firm h. Consider two firms that start period t with equal productivity. A given productivity improvement in one firm relative to the other will result in a larger increase in demand for higher values of μ i > 1. Even though the rivalry effect is present in the model, this does not imply that μ i affects equilibrium TFP growth rates, as these considerations influence R&D incentives at all firms in the industry. In a symmetric equilibrium, firms keep pace with each other technologically so that μ i does not affect equilibrium research expenditure, as it does not affect equilibrium returns. The results hold in any rank-preserving equilibrium. Consistent with our results, Bloom et al (2007) estimate that the rivalry effect is quantitatively dominated by the "spillover effect" as a determinant of research activity.
The model suggests some caution in linking research intensity to demand factors empirically. The most common measure of research intensity is R&D spending divided by sales or, in terms of the model, RND Sales ≡
. Combined with the conditions for optimal input allocation, equation (12) becomes:
This formula would appear to indicate an influence of demand parameters μ i on research spending in the model, and indeed Cohen et al (1987) find some indicators of industry concentration to be related to the ratio of research spending to sales. However, in an environment with imperfect competition, the volume of sales contains a markup over cost, which is not an indicator of the quantity of resources devoted to research as opposed to other activities. The denominator in this measure of research activity contains demand side variables by construction. Future empirical work may turn out to substantiate an economic link between R&D and markups or other demand factors: however, the model suggests caution in employing sales-based measures of R&D activity in such work.
Quantitative findings
We now calibrate our model using US industry data to identify whether set of opportunity factors can account for observed industry differences in R&D and productivity growth. We match the model to United States data because of the rich sources of information available, because the US is arguably at the technological frontier in most industries, and because GDP has grown at a stable rate for over a century, which is consistent with our focus on the balanced growth path of our model.
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We address the following questions:
1. The model predicts that productivity growth should be positively linked to the opportunity parameters ψ i , ρ i and to η i . Which of these parameters do the data suggest to be the main factor? 2. The model suggests that R&D intensity should be linked to opportunity parameters, but also to appropriability A j . Which of these parameters do the data suggest to be the main factor?
3. What values of these parameters best account for industry variation in productivity change and research intensity in the data?
To answer these questions, we proceed as follows. We first calibrate as many parameters as possible in the model using post-war US data. Then, we ask what combinations of the remaining parameters allow the model to best match industry data on productivity growth and R&D intensity. This allows us to assess whether variation in certain variables is sufficient to account for observed industry differences, and the circumstances under which the variables we do not observe directly are or are not able to account for the data.
We do not match measured TFP growth rates directly. For example, several of the longterm rates of TFP growth estimated by Jorgenson et al (2006) are negative, and we do not believe that productivity can decline in absolute terms in the long run when it is driven by knowledge accumulation. We take seriously the view of Greenwood et al (1997) among others that quality improvements are an important source of productivity change. Thus, we calibrate model TFP growth rates using quality-adjusted relative prices. Specifically, equation (17) implies a relationship between relative rates of price decline, capital shares, and TFP growth, and we use these to compute relative TFP growth rates.
To our knowledge, comparable quality adjusted prices are available only for durable goods. Hence, we assume that m = 2, so that there is only one sector producing nondurables. We set z = 15, so that there are 14 capital-producing industries. This partition was the finest that allowed us to match the relative price data with the patent data we employ later to measure knowledge spillovers.
It is worth pointing out that our quantitative conclusions turn out not to depend on the use of these particular industries. The main sources of discipline on our quantitative exercise turn out to be (a) the extent of variation in productivity growth rates, and (b) the fact that productivity growth and R&D intensity are positively linked across industries. Ilyina and Samaniego (2009) find support for this positive relationship in post-war US data for a comprehensive sample of industries. 17 The model ranking of TFP and R&D intensity is stable in a rank-preserving equilibrium. To make industry comparisons of TFP growth rates and research intensity requires those features to be stable over time in the data. We computed TFP growth rates for durable goods over non-overlapping 10-year periods, using the procedure below. We found that the correlations between cross sections were always 80% or higher. Ilyina and Samaniego (2008) find that the decade-to-decade correlation of R&D intensity across US manufacturing industries is over 90%. , and the relative price of good i in the data isp it pct (measured at the level of the good, i.e. gross output) then
Calibration
1−α m where α m is the share of intermediate goods in gross output. We set α m = 0.45, and find that g q = 1.052 −1 . In the working version of the paper, however, we show that results are strikingly similar when we use unadjusted prices.
Let g y equal the growth factor of real output measured in units of consumption. US National Income and Product Accounts indicate that g y = 1.022 in consumption units. In the model, g y also represents the growth of real consumption, so we can compute the growth rate of capital in quality-adjusted units g k = g y /g q . The model implies that g k = γ 1/(1−α x ) x , which implies that γ x = 1.052. The growth rate of the population is reported by the US Census Bureau. Table 1 summarizes the values of these variables.
The final two variables required for calibration are γ i and η i . As discussed earlier, we compute TFP growth to match the decline in the quality-adjusted relative prices for our 14 capital goods industries. This mapping is slightly complicated in our model compared to Greenwood et al (1997) because we allow input shares to differ across industries. Using (17), the definition of p x and the calibrated value of γ x , we compute γ i as follows:
where values of
are drawn from Cummins and Violante (2002) , and adjusted as discussed above.
We measure η i as the capital share of research expenditures using data from the National Science Foundation Industrial Research and Development Survey. 18 The values of γ i and η i are reported in Table 2 .
Opportunity and TFP growth rates
The model implies that variation in industry productivity growth rates depends on technological opportunity. We now use the data to learn about which of these factors appear quantitatively important. Using (10) and the restrictions imposed by balanced growth, industry productivity growth follows:
Our first step is to ask whether variation in η i can account for industry variation in γ i . To this end, we use (34) to compute
as a residual. Results are reported in Table 2 . The correlation between γ i and
is 0.985. There are two reasons why the contribution of η i to industry growth differences is low. First, as seen in Figure 1 , the correlation between η i and γ i is not statistically significant (although it is positive, as implied by the model). Second, most importantly, variation in η i is not of sufficient magnitude to generate large differences in γ i on its own. To see this, we re-compute γ i from (34) under the assumption that
was equal in all industries. When we set
to equal the weighted average across industries, we found that productivity growth rates ranged from 2.9% to 4.7%, which accounts for only about a tenth of the variation in Table 2 . Thus, industry differences in productivity growth reflect significant variation in technological opportunities, as captured by ψ i and ρ i .
Determining whether ρ i or ψ i is responsible for differences in γ i requires measures of at least one of these two parameters. Distinguishing between ρ i and ψ i is also needed later to compute R&D intensities. In what follows, we follow two approaches:
1. First, we discuss a possible measure of ρ i , based on patent data. We then think of ψ i as a residual, computing it from the values of Table 2 for given values of ρ i . We will find that variation in ρ i is unable to jointly account for industry differences in productivity growth rates and R&D intensity, whereas variation in ψ i is able to do so.
2. Second, we assume that ρ i is perfectly correlated with γ i , to give variation in ρ i its "best shot." Thus, there will be parameterizations under which variation in ρ i accounts for all industry differences in γ i , and parameterizations under which ψ i accounts for all differences in γ i . Even so, in this case we still find that variation in ρ i is unlikely to matter much.
Parameter ρ i is linked to the magnitude of knowledge spillovers received by each industry. Following Jaffe et al (2000), we measure knowledge spillovers using the NBER patent citation database described in Hall et al (2001) . For each patent granted over the period 1975-1999, the database mentions every patent that it cites -its bibliography. The database also includes patent categories for patents granted 1963-1999, at the 2-digit SIC level and also more finely. We use this information to assign patents to industries.
At the United States Patent and Trademark Office, one role of the patent examiner is to determine that the applicant has cited all relevant "prior art," and the presumption is that this mechanism ensures that patent citations accurately report the intellectual precursors of the patent under review. The examiner's name is reported on the patent, so the examiner is responsible for any mis-attributions. This suggests that patent citations accurately reflect knowledge spillovers from sources of patented knowledge. Since the bibliography does not include knowledge that is not patented, the presumption is also that the ranking of extent to which different sectors build on unpatented knowledge is not too different from ranking constructed using patented knowledge.
Parameter ρ i represents the extent to which new knowledge in industry i "stands on the shoulders" of prior knowledge. Hence, to get a sense of relative magnitudes of ρ i between industries we examine the rate at which patents in a given industry cite other patentsthe rate of "backwards citations". We call this CIT i . We assume that relative CIT i is an indicator of relative ρ i , and use CIT i to examine a variety of possible parameterizations of the model, by changing the range over which ρ i varies while assuming that ρ i and CIT i are correlated.
Aggregate estimates of the decreasing returns to research investment (analogous to ψ i ) vary between 0.1 and 0.6 (see Kortum (1993) and Samaniego (2007) for surveys): however, to our knowledge industry level estimates do not exist. Hence, we will think of ψ i as a residual, computing it from
for given values of ρ i . We remind the reader that we follow two approaches to selecting ρ i : we use patent citation data, and we also give variation in ρ i its "best shot" by assuming it is perfectly correlated with productivity growth rates. Figure 1 reports the correlation between CIT i and γ i . We do indeed find a correlation between backwards citations and productivity growth. 19 This suggests that ρ i may be important for industry variation in productivity growth rates -although, just because ρ i is correlated with γ i does not mean that it is a quantitatively important factor behind variation in γ i , something we will check below.
Decomposing opportunity
To make further progress in decomposing the sources of opportunity that account for industry growth, we turn to the model predictions for research intensity.
Assuming that CIT i is an indicator of relative values of ρ i , we examine a broad set of possible mappings between CIT i and ρ i . Given the series for Table 2 , a choice of ρ i implies values of ψ i for each industry. Specifically, given a lower bound ρ and an upper bound ρ, we assume that ρ i is perfectly correlated with CIT i between these two parameters. We explore all values of ρ andρ in the range [−1, 1), provided ρ ≤ρ. We setρ < 1 because this is required for positive industry productivity growth rates. The bound ρ ≥ −1 is arbitrary but, as we shall see, results for lower values are straightforward to infer. Note that, given a value of γ i , parameters ρ i and ψ i are negatively related.
The correlation between ρ i and γ i equals the correlation between CIT i and γ i by construction, which is 60% (the P-value is 2%). However, the correlation between ψ i and γ i is also high for most parameterizations -see Figure 2 . Thus, correlations between parameters and productivity are not enough to indicate whether variation in γ i is mainly due to ρ i or ψ i . It is interesting to note that the highest correlations between ψ i and γ i occur when the upper and lower bounds on ρ i are close together (near the 45 degree line): in this case, although ρ i and γ i are significantly correlated, most of the variation in productivity is in fact due to differences in ψ i . On the 45 degree line itself, ρ =ρ, so that variation in ρ i accounts for none of industry variation in productivity growth.
Opportunity, appropriability and research
To further narrow down the parameters that best account for the data, we use the model to compute predicted research intensity at the industry level, and examine for what parameter values the model generates research intensity values that most resemble those in the data. We look at two different criteria:
1. Is research intensity in the model correlated with research intensity in the data? 2. Is the magnitude of research intensity in the model close to that in the data?
Following the literature we measure R&D intensity as the median ratio of R&D expenditures to sales among firms in Compustat over the period 1950-2000. 20 The maintained assumption is that the median firm in Compustat is subject to weak if any financial constraints, so that its R&D behavior should reflect the "pure" technologically determined level of R&D intensity for the industry. See Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2008) on the use of median firms to detect technological characteristics. We discard the top and bottom 1% of observations in the sample, to reduce the influence of outliers and of possible measurement error.
21
The model R&D spending to sales ratio ¡ RND Sales ¢ is determined by equation (32) , which requires an expression for the growth rate in the shadow price of knowledge χ it+1 χ it along a balanced growth path. Using (15), (17) and (29) this expression is:
Thus, computing RND Sales in (32) requires values for industry-specific parameters ρ i , ψ j , A i and μ i , as well as G, which is common across industries. Again, we examine a variety of values of ρ i and ψ i by assuming a linear mapping between ρ i and CIT i as described above, and alternatively by assuming ρ i is correlated with γ i .
22
As for appropriability A i , we follow two approaches.
1. We use patent data to get a sense of the likely values of A i . 20 Ideally we would like to use an expenditure-based (RN D it ) rather than a sales-based measure ¡ RN D
Sales
¢
to compute R&D intensity, however, we could not use Compustat to construct the shares of R&D as labor expenditures were very sparsely reported. 21 The medians were in fact quite close to R&D/sales numbers reported by the NSF, so we view them as accurate (NSF values were not available for all industries, which is why we did not use them directly). 22 Notice that 1 −
is the rate of economic depreciation of knowledge in our model. We find that computed values of this expression are almost perfectly correlated with γ i , and vary between 5% and 23% across industries. Samaniego (2007) surveys values for the rate of economic depreciation of knowledge in a 1-sector economy that range between 10% and 25%. 18 2. We select A i ∈ [0, 1] so as to maximize the influence of appropriability on R&D intensity.
Appropriability is related to whether spillovers across firms are a significant source of knowledge. As before, we use patent data to get a sense of the magnitude of these spillovers. The NBER patent citation database reports the assignee of each patent awarded since 1969. Consequently, we can establish what proportion of own-industry citations are in fact selfcitations. We define appropriability A i as this ratio. The required assumption is that A i does not differ significantly for a given industry depending on whether or not knowledge is patented. If unpatented knowledge flows across firms more easily than patented knowledge, then the measure of spillovers implied by the patent data is an upper bound on A i . On the other hand, if ideas that flow most easily across firms are the ones patented, then our numbers represent a lower bound on A i . As we shall see, appropriability differences between patented and unpatented knowledge must be quite drastic to affect our results (in fact, when we assumed that A i varied between 0 and 1 and that it was perfectly correlated with R&D intensity, our results were almost identical). Table 2 finds that appropriability A i is generally quite low -18.5% on average. In addition, it appears to vary little across industries, ranging in the interval [0.12, 0.34]. Thus, R&D intensity in equation (18) will be mainly determined by differences in ρ i and ψ i .
We calibrate μ i using industry markups from Oliveira, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) . These authors report markups over average cost. In the model, μ i is linked to the markup over production cost -which could be significantly larger than the markup over total cost in very research-intensive industries. In the Appendix we discuss the mapping between the reported markups and those required to calibrate μ i .
Finally we set values for G. Using the Euler condition (29), the gross return to capital, G = (1 + r) /g q . We match the real rate of return on capital to be 7% as in Greenwood et al (1997) . Hence the gross return in terms of capital goods is G = 1.07/g q .
We find that the strongest correlations between R&D in the model and in the data (about 0.72) are generated by parameterizations under which ρ andρ are close. See Figure  3 . However, the magnitude of R&D intensity in the model is much larger than in the data for most parameterizations. Magnitudes are comparable only when ρ andρ are both high. See Figure 4 .
Along the locus of parameterizations such that overall R&D intensity in the model economy matches that in the data, the parameters that generate model industry R&D intensity numbers that correlate most strongly with those in the data satisfy ρ =ρ = 0.94, so that differences in ρ i account for little of the variation in γ i . Thus, industry variation in R&D intensity indicates that ρ andρ are close, whereas the magnitude of R&D intensity indicates that the values of ρ andρ are high. As a result, for the parameterization preferred by the data, variation in ψ i is primarily responsible for industry differences in both R&D intensity and productivity growth.
Note that this is not because we have an imperfect measure of ρ i . We repeated this exercise assuming that ρ i was perfectly correlated with γ i , also obtaining the result that the data prefer a parameterization under which variation in ψ i is the paramount factor. Indeed, the results for the figures are almost identical.
There are two reasons for this result. First, (32) and (35) together imply that:
Thus, given the calibrated value of γ i , research intensity depends on ρ i only through A i . Our measures of A i are not correlated with RND Sales and are in fact negatively correlated with CIT i (which we use to rank ρ i across industries), so that industry variation in ρ i does not necessarily translate into industry differences in research intensity.
The main reason is much simpler, however, and in no way hinges on the use of patent data nor on the fact that we are looking at a particular set of industries. The link between ψ i and RND Sales is monotonic, whereas that between ρ i and RN D Sales is non-monotonic -in fact, it is an inverted U-shaped. To see this, we set μ i , A i , α i and η i to be equal across industries, so that
is be perfectly correlated with log γ i . Moreover, we assumed that γ i and ρ i were perfectly correlated. Eliminating variation in A i slightly increased correlations between R&D in the model and the data. However, once more, the correlation between R&D intensity in the model and the data was highest when ρ ≈ρ, and the data preferred a specification with ρ =ρ ≈ 0.9. What happens is that, when values of ρ i differ and the value of ρ i is very high for the highest-growth industries, the value of ψ i in those industries is driven towards zero. Since ψ i enters the R&D expression multiplicatively, this drives research intensity to zero in those industries. As a result, when ρ i is very high in some industries, there is no longer a monotonic relationship between γ i and R&D intensity in the model. Since the data indicate that γ i and R&D intensity are correlated, the presence of variation in ρ i leads patterns of R&D intensity in the model to differ from those in the data. Interestingly, the parameters that give a better correlation between model research intensity and productivity change are those that also yield the strongest link between R&D intensity in the model and the data. For the preferred parameterization, the correlation between R&D intensity in the model and in the data is fully 0.72.
We began the paper noting that several authors have found an empirical link between industry R&D intensity and TFP growth rates -including Terleckjy (1980) and more recently Ilyina and Samaniego (2009) . For the preferred parameterization, the correlation between the research-to-sales ratio in the data and the values of γ i computed using the model is fully 84%. We also find that the correlation between model R&D intensity and γ i is very high for most parameterizations -see Figure 5 .
In the preferred parameterization, since values of ρ i appear close to one, we expect values of ψ i to be relatively small. Table 3 reports values of ψ i that correspond to this parameterization. Are they consistent with the data? As mentioned, aggregate measures of the counterpart of ψ i vary between 0.1 and 0.6, whereas the ω i -weighted average value in the model economy is 0.12, which lies in this range (when ψ i is weighted by R&D intensity, the average value is 0.26). We conclude that the data and the structure of the model together indicate that most of the dispersion in both productivity growth and research intensity is driven by industry differences in ψ i -the extent to which there are decreasing returns to R&D -and that values of ψ i are likely to be small in most industries, consistent with independent data on decreasing returns to research at the aggregate level.
To further assess the robustness of these conclusions, we maximized the ability of A i to account for the R&D data, assuming that A i is distributed between zero and one and that it is perfectly correlated with RND Sales . Our results were essentially the same. Simply put, variation in A i is small compared to variation in γ i , so that the denominator is not significantly affected by appropriability.
Discussion and extensions
We have abstracted from cross-industry spillovers to keep the mechanism transparent, but it would be interesting to include them in the model. There are two reasons why allowing them is unlikely to change our results. First, the model does not suggest that knowledge spillovers are the driving force behind industry differences in productivity: ψ i takes center stage. Second, cross-industry spillovers appear small compared to within-industry spillovers.
To see the second point, we use the patent citation database to estimate the importance of cross-industry citations. This is analogous to classifying all Economics papers by field, and looking at the rates at which papers in any given field cite papers in any other given field. As discussed in Hall et al (2001) , industries seem to vary in their propensity to patent. We handle this by normalizing cross-citations by the total number of patents in the citing industry. Thus, the citation matrix we construct reflects the average rate at which patents in industry i cite patents in any industry j. Table 4 reports the patent citation matrix. Each row corresponds to the average number of citations made by a given industry. Numbers on the diagonal represent within-industry citations. CIT j is the sum of each row, the average number of citations per patent in each industry. For all industries, citations are dominated by within-industry citations, suggesting that cross-industry spillovers are relatively small.
We do not distinguish between product and process innovation, for several reasons. First, much (although by no means all) of the related empirical literature neglects the distinction. Second, it is rare that a "truly new" product is introduced. Rather, thinking of industries as being defined at the 2-or 3-digit SIC level, both product and process innovations may result in improved (or cheaper) consumer (or capital) services of a given type. Thus, our modeling approach is consistent with our use of quality-adjusted price data. Third, although onesector growth models that distinguish between product and process innovation sometimes have different properties (such as Young (1998)), Jones (1999) argues that these properties require a "knife-edge" condition on the parameter linking the rate of product innovation to the scale of the economy. Still, it would be interesting to perform our analysis in a model that allows for product innovation.
There are three ways for a firm to acquire knowledge for use in production. First, firms may produce knowledge by investing in R&D, as in our model. Second, knowledge that spills between firms may be used as an input into R&D. This activity is free in the sense that, for example, if one patent cites another, there is no requirement that any payments be made between patent holders. While our model allows for such spillovers, the knowledge production function (1) implies that a firm can only receive spillovers from other firms if it is also carrying out research, as argued by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) . Third, firms may employ the knowledge produced by other firms in production, by means of a license payment -as in Klenow (1996) . However, Arora et al (2002) find that revenues from licensing equal about 4% of R&D expenditure, suggesting that licensing is not a major incentive behind R&D activity in general. We abstract from this third form of knowledge transfers, as the other two appear to be more quantitatively important. Still, an extension of the model could be useful for studying patterns of licensing activity.
Concluding remarks
We develop a multi-sector, general equilibrium model of endogenous growth, incorporating a number of factors identified in the literature as potential determinants of the costs and benefits of research. We find that the main determinant of productivity growth differences across sectors are the technological opportunity parameters, especially the extent of decreasing returns to research activity. Although this parameter has not been identified as a potentially important source of cross-industry differences in the related literature, it turns out to play a pivotal role in a growth model that is consistent with stable growth over the long run. Theoretically, we find that two more factors of opportunity may be important -the extent to which new knowledge "stands on the shoulders" of prior knowledge, and the capital share of research activity -although quantitatively they do not appear to play an important role.
The fraction of total spillovers that accrues from the firm's own stock of knowledge affects research intensity but not TFP growth, whereas differences in demand factors affect neither, consistent with the lack of robustness in the empirical literature on the role of demand, and in line with a sense in the technology literature that technical change is primarily supply-driven. Nelson and Winter (1977) argue that innovations follow "natural trajectories" that have a technological or scientific rationale rather than being driven by movements in demand and, similarly, Rosenberg (1969) writes of innovation following a "compulsive sequence." In our model, equilibrium differences in long run productivity growth rates depend on opportunity parameters, so that long-run TFP growth rates are determined by technological factors: "natural trajectories" are an equilibrium outcome.
We see several directions for future work. It would be interesting to provide microfoundations for different factors of opportunity and appropriability. For example, could the magnitude of knowledge spillovers or the extent to which they accrue to different agents depend on the institutions that govern research, or even on organizational structure? Also, we have not used our model to explore policy implications. However, one of the key implications of our results is that a "one-size fits all" R&D subsidy may not be an optimal policy when technological opportunities vary significantly across industries. We leave this topic for future work.
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A.2 Capital shares
The NSF does not report capital expenditures related to R&D, rather they report a value of depreciation costs. Using a perpetual inventory method and the physical depreciation rates in the model, we derive the capital stocks implied by the depreciation costs and use them to impute the values of η i reported in Table 2 . This requires a value of the depreciation rate for capital δ: we use a value of 0.056, which we calibrate as in Greenwood et al (1997) . We use the 2003 edition of the Industrial Research and Development Survey.
Values of α i come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Industry GDP tables. Not all industries were specifically listed as the industry classification of the BEA is coarser than ours. Thus, for example, the BEA entry for "Machinery" included both our "Machinery" and our "Mining and oilfield Machinery". In this case we used the same value for both sub industries. We used tables for 1987-1997 as earlier years were even more aggregated. We followed the same procedure for η i .
A.3 Research intensity
Research intensity numbers from Compustat include labor and materials costs but not capital. In the model we have removed intermediates, and we also include capital. To make the numbers comparable, first, we remove materials using the materials share of R&D in NSF data (which is small and averages around a fifth of labor spending). Then, to impute capital expenditures related to research, we use the values of η i reported earlier. Finally, formal R&D spending does not necessarily reflect all the costs of conducting R&D. For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics 2007 report that, for firms in NAICS 541700 (Scientific Research and Development Services) scientists and engineers make up about 40 percent of the wage bill. Assuming that the activities of pure research firms are broadly similar to those at research units within firms that do not outsource their R&D, this suggests multiplying the Compustat R&D numbers by a factor of 2.5. The effect of the above adjustments was to increase the values of RND Sales somewhat above the raw numbers in Compustat, but the results that follow were qualitatively unchanged by using the "raw" numbers from Compustat instead.
A.4 Markups
Markups are from Oliveira, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) . Where industry values were not available for the US, we took them from Canada (or in the case of Aircraft from Italy 23 ). These are markups over average cost. In the model calibrating μ i requires a measure of the markup over production cost -which could be significantly larger than the markup over total cost in very research-intensive industries. Let M be the markup in the model, so M = 1 μ . N is the measured markup, which is the markup over average cost. Suppose P is sales, R is research cost and C is production cost. Then, the measured markup N = P −R−C R+C . Let r equal R&D intensity as measured in the data (relative to sales), so that R = rP . Then, it can be shown that M = r(N+1)+N 1+r(N+1)
, so the measured markups can be derived from those reported in the data using R&D intensity numbers.
B Derivations and Proofs
B.1 Firm's maximization
Taking the demand function p iht (.) and input prices {w t , R t } as given, the firm chooses
. to maximize (4) subject to (1)-(3). Optimal conditions imply:
Using (3), relative prices are,
All firms take {w t , R t } as given, so marginal rate of substitution between capital and labor are equal across activities, firms and sectors:
. Using (37), the capital-labor ratios in equations (5) (7) imply:
So (17) follows from focusing on a rank-preserving equilibrium where γ iht = γ it and assuming price elasticities of demand are constants and sector-specific. R&D Intensity: The firm's optimal allocation of capital across activities implies (11) and its optimal condition for T iht+1 implies (12). Using (11),
. Together with (2)-(4),
where the last equality follows from (1) & (39). Rearrange (12) as:
where the equality follows from (1), finally,
Similarly :
where the last equality follows from (40). Substituting into the definition of RND iht to obtain (13). To derive χ iht /χ iht+1 , use (2) & (39):
Proposition 1. It follows from (51) that g q is constant if and only if γ c is constant, i.e. γ i are constants ∀i = 1, ..m − 1. Given n i , g k and γ i are constants, (52) and (40) imply χ it+1 /χ it and n it /l it are constants ∀i, so l i are constants ∀i.
Corollary 1 Let y = P p it pct y it . Along BGP, c/y, real interest rate and R&D spending to GDP ratio are constants. Moreover,
Proof. Given G and g q are constants, it follows from (29) that real interest rate r is constant.
Using (53) and (48), GDP per head:
so y/c is constant given T xt k α x −1 t and c/ (qk) are constants. Using (41) and (39),
Given constant R t /p xt and (59), the R&D spending to GDP ratio is constant. For (58), γ c follows from substituting (10) and
, g c and g q follow from (51) and constant c/ (qk).
Proposition 3 Along the BGP, the non-negativity constraints on l i and n i do not bind and the transversality conditions for T i and k are satisfied if g ( 1+
and Υ is defined in (58).
Proof of Proposition 3. First note that βg N < 1 is required for the household maximization to be well-defined. The transversality conditions (TVC) are: lim
0, ∀i. χ it and ζ t are the corresponding shadow values. Using (35),
where it uses (57),
and constant c/ (qk). Using (58), Figure 4 -Total R&D intensity in the capital sector of the model economy divided by the same statistic in the data, for different parameterizations. A value of one indicates that R&D intensity in the model is double that in the data. The correlation between patent citations CIT i and ρ i is assumed to be one, and ρ i is distributed between the upper and lower bounds depicted in the graph. Table 3 -R&D intensity in the model and in the data. Values of ρ i and ψ i are those that maximize the correlation between R&D in the model and the data -specifically,ρ and ρ equal 0.94. The column "Data" represents R&D spending at the median firm in Compustat, adjusted as described in the text. The third column represents the values of ψ i used to compute R&D intensity in the model Table 4 -Patent citation matrix derived from the NBER patent citation database. We focus on 14 durable goods sectors to match between our patent citation data and the data we use to calibrate the model. "Other" indicates all industries other than these 14. 
